INTRODUCTION
In 2009, an auto-mechanic from Topeka, Kansas by the name of William Marotta answered a Craigslist ad posted by Angela Bauer and Jennifer Schreiner, a lesbian couple seeking a private sperm donor for artificial insemination.
1 After discussing the issue with his wife, Marotta arranged a meeting with the couple and agreed to donate. The parties then signed a contractual agreement intended to sever Marotta's parental rights and relieve him of any future child support obligations.
2 Once the agreement was signed, Marotta produced a sperm sample and delivered it to the couple's Both Marotta and the state motioned for summary judgment in October of 2013, and after hearing arguments from both sides, the Shawnee County District Court issued an order granting the state's motion and declaring Marotta the legal father of the child. 12 This case, which Marotta plans to appeal, offers a paradigm that highlights the complex legal issues arising from the practice of unassisted, athome artificial insemination. The venue for the showdown could not be more appropriate, as Kansas is no stranger to the debate over the rights of sperm donors. In 2008, the Kansas Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of its paternity statute when a donor attempted to assert his parental rights after donating sperm to a friend. 13 That case, however, did not involve a contract between the mother and the donor, and unlike the Marotta case, the parties used a physician to perform the artificial insemination.
14 The use of a private 10 Heather Hollingsworth & John Hanna, Sperm Donor Legal Issues Highlighted by Kansas Case, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 4, 2013, 3:11 AM) 14 See id.
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In an effort to raise awareness to the legal obstacles often faced by private sperm donors and same-sex couples, this note examines the different approaches courts often take in resolving paternity issues, and recommends a two-part solution that alleviates public policy concerns. Part I of this note explores the history and purposes of the Uniform Parentage Act of 1973 and its subsequent amendments in 2002. Part II focuses on states that have not adopted the Uniform Parentage Act's 2002 amendments and examines paternity decisions involving private sperm donation within those states. Part III, by contrast, seeks to examine court decisions in states that have adopted the amendments to the UPA. Part IV continues by discussing the policy arguments in favor of and against unassisted, at-home artificial insemination. Finally, Part V recommends that states adopt the 2002 amendments to the UPA and enact regulations that effectively track donations from private sperm donors.
I. CHANGING SOCIETAL ROLES AND THE UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT
As social views on same-sex relationships evolve and reproductive technologies rapidly advance, the need for a clear understanding of state parentage laws is crucial for all parties involved in assisted reproduction. One of the more recurrent issues that has inundated courts in disputes over parentage is whether the source of sperm used for artificial reproduction is considered a father, with full parental rights and financial obligations, or a donor, where parental rights and financial obligations can be waived. Several scenarios can materialize that give rise to legal issues hinging on a biological father's status as one or the other. For instance, it could be the case that a biological father wishes to claim parental rights and accept financial obligations after donating sperm to a same-sex couple. By contrast, it could also be the case that the biological father wishes waive his parental rights and be absolved of financial obligations. Such situations have been further complicated by the existence of preconception contracts purporting to relinquish parental rights, especially in cases where the biological father seeks to invalidate the contract and assert parenthood.
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The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("Commissioners") attempted to simplify issues of parentage in 1973 with the drafting of the Uniform Parentage Act, which sought to address antiquated notions of parent-child relationships under the common law. 15 The Commissioners envisioned a body of law that granted support rights to children regardless of the marital status of their parents, a concept that was largely absent from the common law prior to 1973. 16 Most states enacted provisions of the Act in one form or another, which signaled a revolution in the law of parentage determination, paternity actions, and child support.
17 As time progressed, however, advances in technology-namely the development of DNA identification-prompted a call for greater modernization of state parentage laws. J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 71 As of the date of this note, the 2002 amendments to the UPA have been adopted in only nine states. 23 The natural consequence has been that a majority of state courts still require physician involvement in artificial insemination in order for a paternal father to relinquish his paternity rights and to relieve him of child support obligations. In these states, arguments in favor of donor status when at-home artificial insemination is performed are likely to fail, as courts are reluctant to interpret the plain language of the 1973 UPA as anything but an absolute requirement that a physician be involved.
24
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ISSN 2164-7976 (online) DOI 10. 5195/pjephl.2014.78 http://pjephl.law.pitt.edu with the plan of raising the child jointly with her friend, Victoria. 25 After consulting various acquaintances and interviewing several potential donors, Mary K. and Victoria ultimately decided on Jhordan C. 26 Over a period of six months, Jhordan C. provided multiple sperm samples to Mary K. in the privacy of her home, and after several attempts, the artificial insemination was successful.
27 After the child's birth, Mary K. allowed Jhordan C. to visit the child on approximately five separate occasions. 28 However, she quickly terminated the visits and attempted to induce Jhordan C. to sign a contract indicating that he would not seek paternity rights.
29 Jhordan C. refused and subsequently initiated an action to establish both paternity and visitation rights. 30 The court ultimately held for Jhordan C., reasoning that Mary K. had "omitted to invoke" the California paternity statute by failing to utilize a licensed physician in the artificial insemination.
31
At the time Jhordan C. was decided, the California statute governing the paternity of sperm donors stated that a "donor of semen provided to a licensed physician for use in artificial insemination of a woman other than the donor's wife is treated in law as if he were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived."
32 As the court noted, the statutory language of the 32 CAL. CIV. CODE § 7005 (California's statutory code has since been amended, and the current statute states: "The donor of semen provided to a licensed physician and surgeon or to a licensed sperm bank for use in assisted reproduction of a woman other than the donor's spouse is treated in law as if he were not the natural parent of a child thereby conceived, unless otherwise J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 73
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33
Mary K. argued that the drafters of the UPA incorrectly assumed that all artificial inseminations would occur under the supervision of a physician, and that the language was merely suggestive as opposed to mandatory.
34
The court, however, was not persuaded. In rejecting Mary K.'s argument, it noted that the initial discussion draft of the UPA did not contain a provision pertaining to physicians, and that "[its] eventual inclusion . . . in the final version of the UPA suggests a conscious decision to require physician involvement." 35 The court went on to say that the " [California] [l]egislature ha [d] embraced the apparently conscious decision by the drafters of the UPA to limit application of the donor nonpaternity provision to instances in which semen is provided to a licensed physician." While the court gave considerable merit to Mary K.'s arguments, they were not enough to trump the intent of the legislature.
E.E. v. O.M.G.R. is a similar case from New
Jersey involving a single woman, E.E., who wanted to have a child but did not want to assume the added expense of going through a physician. 36 As an alternative, E.E. enlisted the services of a friend, O.M.G.R., who produced a sperm sample that was "transported to its intended location [via] kitchen turkey baster."
37 Unlike the case of Jhordan C., the parties in E.E. drafted a consent order that purported to surrender all paternity rights and relinquish all financial obligations of O.M.G.R. 38 The order was signed by both parties and submitted to the court agreed to in a writing signed by the donor and the woman prior to the conception of the child." CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613. J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 74
ISSN J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 75 J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 76 J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 77 In support of his argument, J.S. relied on an earlier Texas case which concluded that donor status was irrelevant in deciding whether a man bringing suit to establish paternity has standing. 58 The court in this case declined to agree, however, saying that J.S.'s argument ignored the statutory language addressing his donor status, 59 which Texas had adopted as a result of the amendments in the 2002 UPA. 60 The court then emphasized the impact that J.S.'s interpretation of the statute would have on the financial and emotional status of children and their mothers:
[U]nder J.S.'s reading of the Family Code, any alleged donor-even one who does not know the mother or one who donates to a sperm bank-could challenge paternity in an original proceeding. Rather than promoting assisted reproduction, such a course of action would subject children born of assisted reproduction and their mothers to the financial and emotional costs of defending suits like this one on the merits.
61

IV. RELEVANT POLICY ISSUES IMPLICATED IN DISCUSSING AT-HOME ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION
The use of known sperm donors in artificial insemination inevitably raises public health concerns. However, it also provides a valuable public service to women and couples who might otherwise be precluded from having children. The following section examines these countervailing issues 57 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.602(3) (West 2013 J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 78 in detail, and seeks to explore some of the underlying forces that might be driving state resistance to changes in public policy.
A. DOES UNREGULATED, PRIVATE SPERM DONATION FROM KNOWN DONORS POSE SIGNIFICANT PUBLIC HEALTH RISKS?
An important factor to consider in discussing the merits of unassisted, at-home artificial insemination is whether it poses any significant public health risks. One concern that has gained a fair amount of traction in the debate is the high frequency with which individual donors often choose to donate, and the potential for adverse consequences that can result.
Take for instance the case of Cynthia Daily, a social worker from the state of Washington. Roughly ten years ago, Daily and her partner decided to use a sperm donor to conceive a child, with the hopes that the child would one day be able to meet some of his siblings.
62 After conceiving, the couple used a website to track the number of children fathered by their son's donor, and as the years went on, they watched the number of siblings grow to 150.
63
While this particular group of donor children is among the largest of its kind, similar groups of 50 or more siblings are cropping up on internet web sites and chat groups across the United States, as more women choose to have children on their own. 64 Id.
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FreeSpermDonors. 65 Although sperm is considered neither a food nor drug, the FDA's Center for Biologistics Evaluation and Research regulates those who commercialize in donation, with the purpose of curbing the spread of communicable diseases. 66 While the FDA generally focuses its attention on traditional sperm banks and not on private donors, Arsenault was particularly public about his activities. Once the FDA caught wind of his operation, it convinced him to agree that he was a legal "establishment" and sent agents to his home to interview him and to obtain records on his activities. By that time, he had already made a total of 340 donations to 36 separate recipients. 67 The FDA determined that Arsenault had not been screening for diseases often enough and issued a cease-manufacture order prohibiting him from making further donations. 68 However, an advocacy group filed a brief with the FDA on Arsenault's behalf, and as a result, the cease-manufacture order was suspended.
69 As of February of 2012, Arsenault had tallied more than 500 donations.
70
Cases such as these inevitably raise public health concerns, and as a result, a growing voice has emerged among parents, donors, and medical experts regarding the possibility that rare genetic diseases could be spread more widely throughout the population. 71 While it is possible to mitigate some of the risks by requiring the donor to undergo comprehensive medical 65 Benjamin Wallace, The Virgin Father, N.Y. MAG. (Feb. 5, 2012) , http://nymag.com/news/features/trent-arsenault-2012-2. 66 Id.
67 It is worth noting that not all of Arsenault's donations have proven successful. As of February, 2012, Arsenault's donations accounted for a total of 14 pregnancies. Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Wallace, supra note 65.
J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 80 screening, 72 self-administered testing might not be as effective in ensuring the healthiest specimen possible when compared to the benefits of using a physician.
Courts have taken notice of this concern as well. In Jhordan C., for example, the California Court of Appeal noted that "a physician can obtain a complete medical history of the donor (which may be of crucial importance to the child during his or her lifetime) and screen the donor for any hereditary or communicable diseases." 73 The court went on to reference a comment in the original version of the UPA, which cites a law review article arguing that health considerations should require physician involvement for statutorily authorized artificial insemination. 74 According to the court, the inclusion of the reference in the comment suggests that "health considerations underlie the decision by the drafters of the UPA to include the physician requirement in the artificial insemination statute."
75
In the Interest of R.C., a 1989 case in the Supreme Court of Colorado, echoes the same sentiment as Jhordan C. The concurrence is particularly illuminating because it references a specific set of guidelines for screening donor sperm, which have been promulgated by the American Fertility Society, the American Association of Tissue Banks, and the Council of 72 See, e.g., Lesbian Insemination, OUR WORLD TOO, http:// ourworldtoo.com/lesbian-insemination/#sperm_banks (last visited Feb. 7, 2014 J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 81
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[The guidelines] recommend extensive infectious disease testing. They also recommend rejecting prospective donors or surrogates with a family history of nontrivial malformation, nontrivial Mendelian disorders, or a chromosomal rearrangement (unless the donor or surrogate has a normal karyotype). The donor or surrogate should not have (or have had) any disease with a known or reliably indicated major genetic component, such as asthma, juvenile diabetes mellitus, epileptic disorder, hypertension, a psychosis, rheumatoid arthritis, or a severe refractive disorder. The guidelines recommend screening donors for autosomal recessive disorders known to be prevalent in their ethnic group, and rejecting carriers. In addition to these definite reasons for rejection, there are certain conditions in relatives that should be considered as reasons for rejection (major psychoses, epileptic disorders, juvenile diabetes mellitus, and early coronary disease, mental retardation, neurologic disorders, unexplained deaths under age thirty, or significant congenital defects).
77
There is also the concern that such a high number of half-siblings in a concentrated geographic area could increase the risk of accidental incest between half-brothers and half-sisters. 78 The issue is compounded by the fact 76 In re R.C., 775 P.2d 27 (Colo. 1989).
77 Id. at 37 n.3 (citing Lori B. Andrews, Legal Aspects of Assisted Reproduction, 541 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 668, 672 (1988) ).
78 See Mroz, supra note 62.
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B. WHAT ABOUT THE BENEFITS?
Despite the plethora of arguments against the practice of at-home artificial insemination, several reasons exist that may prompt would-be mothers to eschew commercial sperm banks and opt for private sperm donation from private, known donors.
One of the more prevalent considerations involved in the decision to choose a private donor is the cost of fertility treatment. Fertility services can be prohibitively expensive, and can often cost women and couples thousands of dollars to conceive. 80 The problem is amplified by the fact that it often takes multiple attempts for an artificial insemination to take, with costs accumulating for each attempt. Additionally, insurance in many states would not cover artificial insemination from private donors unless a woman can show that she has not been able to get pregnant. 81 Such preclusive restrictions pose difficult challenges for women in same-sex relationships and for single women who wish to have children, as payments for the entire treatment are often required up front. When ultrasound monitoring and medication are added to the mix, costs can range up to $4,000.
82 Meanwhile, at-home 79 Libby Kane, The Hidden Costs of Using a Sperm Donor, LEARNVEST (Feb. 4, 2012) , http://www.learnvest.com/2012/02/the-hidden-costs-of-usinga-sperm-donor/. Only about 40% of mothers report donor births despite the recommendation. 80 See Tony Dokoupil, 'Free Sperm Donors' and the Women Who Want Them, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 2, 2011) , http://www.newsweek.com/free-spermdonors-and-women-who-want-them-68233 (describing how the purchase of sperm alone can cost up to $2,000).
81 Id.
J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 83 Aside from alleviating the costs of commercial sperm banks, using a known donor can provide would-be mothers with various psychological and personal benefits as well. For instance, conception can be easier when using a fresh donation instead of one that has been frozen and thawed. Fresh donations have a higher sperm count than frozen sperm, and in many cases, they live longer. 84 While frozen samples live for only about six hours after being thawed, fresh donations can live for up to 36 hours. 85 This lengthens the window period for insemination and allows for a higher likelihood of success outside of a clinical environment.
86
Perhaps one of the greatest benefits to using a known donor (and also one of the main reasons that women and couples choose to forgo commercial sperm banks) is that it provides donor children with the opportunity to know the identities of their biological fathers.
87 This is an especially attractive 83 See AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/Human-ArtificialInsemination-Kit-Inseminations/dp/B00BEZY4NO (last visited Feb. 7, 2014) . It is worth noting that it is possible to successfully conceive using a kitchen turkey baster, which can cost as little as $1.19. See THE WEBSTAURANT STORE, http://www.webstaurantstore.com/nylon-turkeybaster/672P816.html?utm_source=Shopzilla&utm_medium=cse&utm_campa ign=Shopzilla+Campaign (last visited Feb. 7, 2014) . More often than not, however, it is recommended that a disposable syringe from an artificial insemination kit be used instead. See BABYMED, http://www.babymed.com/ home-artificial-insemination-get-pregnant-turkey-baster-method (last visited Feb. 7, 2014) .
84 KNOWN DONOR REGISTRY, http://knowndonorregistry.com/about/faqabout-known-donors#why-would-someone-consider-using-a-private-knowndonor (last visited Feb. 7, 2014) . 85 Id.
86 Id.
87 See KNOWN DONOR REGISTRY, supra note 84.
J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 84 88 Use of a known donor also provides children with the opportunity to have questions answered and to obtain access to medical and genetic information that might not be available from a commercial sperm bank.
89 Sperm banks generally resist revealing their donors' identities, fearing that such openness would scare off potential new candidates. 90 Even sperm banks that choose to reveal donor identities, however, will not do so until the child reaches 18 years of age.
91
The benefits of unassisted, private donation have not gone unnoticed by courts either. The court in Jhordan C., for instance, took particular note of both the high costs and privacy issues inherent in physician-assisted artificial insemination as opposed to conception in the privacy of one's home. 92 The court characterized these concerns as such:
It is true that nothing inherent in artificial insemination requires the involvement of a physician. Artificial insemination is, as demonstrated here, a simple procedure easily performed by a woman in her own home. Also, despite the reasons outlined above in favor of physician involvement, there are countervailing considerations against requiring it. A requirement of physician involvement, as Mary argues, might offend a woman's sense of privacy and reproductive autonomy, might result in burdensome costs to some women, and might interfere with a woman's desire to conduct the 88 Id. 89 
Id.
90 See Dokoupil, supra note 80. 91 
92 See Jhordan C., 179 Cal. App. 3d at 393-94.
J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 85 Some have argued that the Marotta case is strictly about Kansas seeking reimbursement for the assistance it provided to Schreiner and that is has nothing to do with discrimination against same-sex couples. Corey Whelan of the New York-based American Fertility Association, for example, does not fault the state for seeking funds from Marotta. 94 Whelan, who counsels lesbian couples interested in having children and who also has a long standing practice of advising physician involvement in artificial insemination, says that this is not a homophobic issue, and that it is merely financially driven. 95 In like manner, Mark Demaray, a Washington state-based attorney and past president of an organization for attorneys who handle assisted reproduction legal issues, says that the Kansas statute is a "commonsense law."
96 According to Mr. Demaray, it is very common for women seeking artificial insemination to have to go through a doctor's office and get a sworn statement from the doctor that he or she performed the procedure.
97
Marotta and his attorney, Ben Swinnen, see things from a different perspective. Instead of saying it is a "commonsense law," Marotta believes the Kansas statute is outdated and that the state is lagging behind in modern 93 
Id.
94 See Hollingsworth & Hanna, supra note 1. 95 Id. 96 Id. 97 Id.
